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Case No. 20141185-CA 
IN THE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
MICHAEL L. NAY & TRACY L. HANSON, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendants Michael L. Nay and Tracy L. Hanson appeal from 
convictions for production of a controlled substance, a third degree felony; 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree 
felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor. 
Hanson also appeals frmn a conviction for possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
This appeal involves Defendants' challenge to the joinder of their 
cases for trial. When police executed a search warrant of Hanson's house, 
they found her smoking marijuana with her brother, Chad, and their cousin, 
1 
Nay. The police also found, among other things, three glass quart jars of 
marijuana in Nay's backpack; two large bags of marijuana that someone 
had been parceling into smaller bags using a digital scale; two guns, a small 
bag of marijuana, and a book on marijuana horticulture in Hanson's 
bedroom; and a marijuana plant growing in the basement. Hanson later 
confessed that she, Nay, and Chad were all involved in growing and 
preparing to sell marijuana. Chad pleaded guilty. At Nay and Hanson's 
joint trial, Hanson's confession was admitted and all three testified that 
Chad was solely responsible for the marijuana production, although Nay 
and Hanson did admit to smoking the marijuana. 
Issue. Were Defendants prejudiced by being jointly h·ied where all the 
evidence admitted at their joint trial- including Hanson's confession-
would have been admissible in separate trials? 
Standard of Review. Given a trial court's "considerable latitude" m 
joinder decisions, a defendant must show II a clear abuse of discretion in that 
[the ruling] sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial." 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977). See also State v. McGrath, 749 
P.2d 631, 633 (Utah 1988). 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute and rules are reproduced in the addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-1 (West 2004); and Utah Rule of Evidence 801. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendants challenge the joinder of their cases for trial. Defendants 
opposed the State's motion for joinder, arguing that they each had 
irreconcilable and mutually exclusive defenses and that Hanson's 
confession to the police would be inadmissible hearsay in a separate trial for 
Nay. R104, 131-34. The trial court granted the State's joinder motion, R148-
49, and a jury convicted both defendants on all charges, R304:338-39. 
A. Summary off acts. 2 
Armed with a search warrant, police entered Hanson's house. They 
found Hanson in the living room smoking marijuana with her brother, 
Chad, and their cousin, Nay. R304:277, 299-300. 
1 The State will use "R" to refer to the record in Nay's case. To the 
extent the relevant filings and orders are identical in Nay's and Hanson's 
cases, the State will cite only to the record in Nay's case. When necessary, 
the State will use "R(Hanson)" to refer to the record in Hanson's case. 
2 Because this is an appeal from a jury verdict, the State presents the 
facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, addressing conflicting 
evidence only to the extent necessary to understand the issue on appeal. See 
State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, 13 n.2, 361 P.3d 104. 
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Police found in the same room a grinder with marijuana residue; 
rolling papers for joints; a corked vase with marijuana inside; a digital scale 
in a carrying case that also contained a marijuana pipe; two blue bowls with 
marijuana residue; and two roughly gallon-sized plastic bags of marijuana, 
one of which had the marijuana apportioned among twelve smaller bags. 
R303:23-24, 32-33, 38, 41-47, 50; State's Ex4. They also found Nay's 
backpack, which had three glass quart jars of marijuana. R303:24. 
In Hanson's bedroom, the police found two guns, a small amount of 
bagged marijuana in her dresser, and, near her bed, a book entitled 
Marijuana Horticulture: The Indoor/Outdoor Medical Grower's Bible. R304:14, 
17, 21, 25, 32-33; State's Ex14. 
On the kitchen table, the police found marijuana in a paper bag. In a 
kitchen drawer, they found about two more ounces in a plastic bowl. 
R304:6-7, 11, 136-37, 140. 
The lead officer on the case, Detective Dwight Jenkins, noticed 
potting soil and several jugs of fertilizer near the back door but thought 
nothing o.f it until he reached the basement-a small boiler room and coal 
room accessed by a hatch cut into the floor near the back door. R304:36-39, 
328, 332; State's Ex 16. There, Detective Jenkins found a live marijuana 
plant, three to four feet tall, growing in a pot under a fluorescent light. 
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R304:43, 49. Reflective foil covered the wall, and a heater and fan sat 
nearby. R304:43, 51. On the floor were three dead, drying marijuana plants. 
R304:50. 
The police arrested Nay, Hanson, and Chad and informed them of 
their Miranda rights. R304:68. Detective Jenkins interviewed Hanson at the 
jail after reminding her of her Miranda rights. R304:71. Hanson "was calm 
and collected," "seemed coherent," and "was in control of her faculties and 
knew what was happening." R304:71-72, 110. Hanson confessed that she, 
Nay, and Chad had all been "trying their hand at growing marijuana." 
R304:74. She said that Chad "helped a little" but was not very good at it, so 
she and Nay "did the bulk of the work." R304:74-75. Hanson said that Nay 
and Chad got a couple pounds of marijuana from someone else and, when 
the police entered the house, they had been weighing and preparing it for 
all three of them to sell. R304:74, 76-77. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Nay, Hanson, and Chad with several drug-related 
offenses. After Chad pleaded guilty, the State moved to join Nay's and 
Hanson's cases for trial. R104-11. Nay and Hanson opposed the motion. 
They conceded that the allegations related to the same act or criminal 
episode. R133-34. But they argued that their defenses were irreconcilable 
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and mutually exclusive under the assumption that Hanson's defense would 
consist of her confession, which implicated Nay. R131-33. The trial court 
rejected their argument, stating that Hanson's confession could not be 
considered her "defense"; therefore, the co-defendants' defenses would not 
be irreconcilable or mutually exclusive. R148-49. Defendants also argued 
that Hanson's confession was hearsay and, while admissible in a separate 
trial for her, would be inadmissible in a trial against Nay. R133. The trial 
court rejected that argument, stating that Hanson's confession would be 
admissible in Nay's trial as a prior inconsistent statement. R149. 
At a joint jury trial, Detective Jenkins and other officers testified to 
what they found during the search. Detective Jenkins also testified without 
objection to what Hanson told him in the interview at the jail. R304:69-77. 
Chad testified for the defense, stating that he alone was responsible 
for growing the marijuana, bringing the bagged marijuana to Hanson's 
house, and weighing it to prepare for sale- though he occasionally slipped 
and referred to "we" before correcting himself. R304: 218-26, 231. He 
stated that he had a key to Hanson's house and that he would go there to 
tend to the marijuana plant while she was at work, but that as soon as 
Hanson found out about it, she insisted that he remove it from her house. 
R304:227-29. Chad said he was making arrangements to do that. R304:228. 
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But when asked how Nay and Hanson reacted to him weighing out the 
marijuana to sell, Chad said the others "were just there smoking it." 
R304:234-35. And when the police showed up, Chad said, he put the jars of 
marijuana in Nay's backpack. R304:221. 
Nay also testified. He claimed the backpack as his own but denied 
ownership or knowledge of the marijuana in it and denied any wrongdoing 
except for smoking marijuana that evening. R304:270-77. Nay also testified 
that Chad was solely responsible for the marijuana. R304:276. He stated 
that when Chad took out the marijuana and started weighing and bagging 
it, Hanson "seemed a little hesitant" and "a little uncomfortable," but she 
"didn't voice any objections." R304:290. 
Hanson took the stand as well. She testified that she did not 
remember being interviewed or-if she was-what she said to the police, 
perhaps because of the stress of the situation and the effect of the marijuana. 
R304:296-99, 308-09. But she denied the truth of the confession, stating that 
Chad was solely responsible for the marijuana and that all she did was 
smoke it that evening. R304:299-306. She testified that she had not given 
Chad a key and that he must have found her hidden spare key. R304:312-
13. She said that when she arrived home from work that night, Nay and 
Chad were outside her house waiting for her to let the1n in. R304:311-13. 
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Although she testified to being surprised to see them because she had not 
spoken to Chad that day, R304:312, Chad had testified that he called her 
earlier that day to see when she would be getting off work, R304:231. 
Hanson testified that, once inside, she got upset when Chad took out 
the bags of marijuana. R304:314-15. She told him to take his marijuana and 
leave, but he refused and began gathering things to weigh the marijuana. 
R304:315-16. Hanson said that she got increasingly upset as they argued, 
and she moved from room to room cleaning things as a way to channel her 
frustration. R304:315-19. Hanson calmed down when Chad got her to 
smoke a joint. But she continued to protest, using Marijuana Horticulture-
which she said Chad had brought and set on the coffee table while they 
were smoking-to point out the possible penalties they could face. 3 
R304:306, 318, 323-24. Hanson also testified that she did not know about 
the marijuana growing in her basement until a day or two before the police 
showed up. R304:325. 
The jury convicted Nay and Hanson of production of a controlled 
substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and 
3 Hanson testified that she 1nust have taken the book into her 
bedroom-where the police found it-as she moved from room to room in 
her agitated state. R304:323-24. 
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possession of drug paraphernalia. R239-40; R(Hanson):248-49. It also 
convicted Hanson of possession of a firearm by a restricted person. 
R(Hanson):248-49. The court sentenced Nay to two concurrent prison 
tenns of 0 to 5 years and one concurrent jail term of 6 months. R288-89. 
The court suspended the prison and jail terms and ordered Nay to serve 36 
months on probation, which included serving 45 days in jail. R288. The 
court imposed total fines of $11,000, suspending all but $950. R288. Hanson 
received the same sentence, plus an additional concurrent, suspended 0-to-
5-year prison sentence and $5,000 fine for the firearm offense. 
R(Hanson)297-98. Defendants timely appealed. R292; R(Hanson)301. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants argue that they were prejudiced by the joinder of their 
cases for trial. They do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, and 
other than joinder, they do not argue that any error-whether 
constitutional, evidentiary, or otherwise-warrants relief on appeal. 
Joinder of co-defendants' cases for trial turns on a two-pronged 
analysis. The first prong looks at the nature of the co-defendants' 
participation in the criminal activity. The second looks at whether joinder 
would prejudice any party. Defendants challenge only the second prong, 
arguing that they were prejudiced by the admission of evidence at their 
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joint trial that-according to them-would have been inadmissible in 
separate trials. But Defendants were not prejudiced because all the 
evidence admitted at the joint trial would have been admissible in separate 
trials. 
Specifically, Nay asserts that he was prejudiced by a joint trial 
because Hanson's confession would have been excluded in a separate trial 
as inadmissible hearsay. But in light of her trial testimony, Hanson's 
confession was a prior inconsistent statement. It was thus admissible 
against both Nay and Hanson as non-hearsay under rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, whether or not they were tried together. The trial court 
was thus well within its discretion to join the cases for trial. 
For the first time on appeal, Nay argues that he was also prejudiced 
by joinder because the Confrontation Clause would have barred Hanson's 
confession from being introduced in a separate trial against Nay. Both 
Defendants argue - also for the first time on appeal- that they were 
prejudiced by joinder because each other's testimony would have been 
excluded against the other in separate h·ials under rules 402 and 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, as irrelevant, unduly confusing, and misleading to the 
JUry. 
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This Court should not reach these new arguments because 
Defendants have not acknowledged that they forfeited them by not raising 
them below, and they have not briefed any exception to the preservation 
rule. 
But even under plain error review, Defendants' remaining arguments 
would fail. First, the Confrontation Clause does not forbid using the out-of-
court statement of a witness who testifies at trial. Defendants offer nothing 
to show that Hanson could not or would not have testified just as she did at 
the joint trial. Although Nay argues that Hanson's claimed lack of memory 
about the confession would impede his ability to cross-examine her in a 
separate trial, U.S. Supreme Court precedent squarely forecloses that 
argument: A testifying witness's faulty memory does not render 
inadequate the right to cross-examine that witness. Thus, failing to sever 
the trials on this basis was not error, let alone an obvious one. 
Defendants' second unpreserved argument fares no better. 
Defendants have not shown how their testimonies-which were largely 
consistent in disclaiming responsibility for the drugs and casting the entire 
blame on Chad- were irrelevant to each other or so confusing and 
misleading that they would have been excluded under rules 402 or 403 in 
11 
separate trials. Thus, they again have not shown obvious error in trying 
them jointly. 
Finally, there is no reasonable likelihood of a different result if the 
trials had been severed. The evidence against both Defendants was 
overwhelming. When the police executed the search warrant, they found 
marijuana all over Hanson's house. Defendants admit that they were 
smoking marijuana. Chad-at least-was weighing and parceling 
marijuana into smaller bags to sell, and Defendants implicitly admit that 
they were aware of what he was doing. The police found three large jars of 
marijuana in Nay's backpack and marijuana in Hanson's bedroom dresser 
and kitchen drawers and growing in her basement. On this evidence, Nay 
would have been convicted even if Hanson's confession had not come in. 
And Hanson would have been convicted regardless of whether Nay 
testified. More importantly, excluding each other's testimony would not 
have helped them where-like Chad-they all corroborated each other's 
stories and blained everything on Chad. 
In sum, Defendants have not shown that the trial court abused its 




DEFENDANTS CANNOT SHOW THAT THEY WERE 
PREJUDICED BY THEIR JOINT TRIAL BECAUSE 
ALL THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT THAT TRIAL 
WOULD HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE IN SEPARATE 
TRIALS. 
Joinder of co-defendants' cases for trial is appropriate when (1) the 
charges could have been joined in a single information because the co-
defendants allegedly participated in the same criminal act, conduct, or 
episode, and (2) no party would be prejudiced by the joinder. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-8a-l (West 2004). But a defendant is not prejudiced by the 
evidence presented at a joint h·ial when that evidence would also be 
admissible in separate trials. Cf Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 
(1993) ( discussing the converse rule- that prejudice "might" result from 
evidence "probative of a defendant's guilt but technically admissible only 
against a codefendant" being used in a joint trial). 
Defendants concede that the charges filed against them could have 
been joined in a single information, thus satisfying the first step in the 
joinder analysis. Aplt. Br. at 39. They challenge only the trial court's 
conclusion as to prejudice arising from joinder. Nay argues that Hanson's 
statement to Detective Jenkins, in which she admitted responsibility and 
directly implicated Nay and Chad, would have been inadmissible hearsay 
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in a separate trial, and that a joint trial thus prejudiced him. Aplt. Br. at 36-
39. Nay alternatively argues-for the first time on appeal- that Hanson's 
confession also would have been inadmissible in a separate trial against him 
under the Confrontation Clause. Aplt. Br. at 27-36. Both Defendants 
further assert- also for the first time on appeal- that rules 402 and 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, would have precluded them from testifying in each 
other's trials. 4 
Only Nay's hearsay argument is preserved. And he cannot prevail on 
it because Hanson's confession was not hearsay: Given her testimony at 
trial, the confession qualified as a prior inconsistent statement. Because the 
statement would have been admissible in separate trials, Nay cannot show 
that he was prejudiced by the joint trial or that there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome had the trial court denied the State's 
joinder motion. 
4 Defendants' brief generally does not differentiate between 
arguments asserted on behalf of each client. However, the hearsay and 
Confrontation arguments logically apply only to Nay's appeal. As Hanson 
conceded before the h·ial court, her confession would be admissible in her 
separate trial. R(Hanson)133. See also Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (providing 
that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if "offered against an opposing 
party" and "made by the party in an individual or representative capacity"). 
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This Court should not reach Defendants' remaining arguments 
because they are unpreserved and Defendants argue no exception to the 
preservation rule. In any event, the remaining arguments would fail under 
plain error review. Just as the Confrontation Clause did not exclude 
Hanson's confession in the joint trial, it would not have excluded it in a 
separate trial. And, contrary to Nay's argument, a witness's claimed 
memory loss does not render inadequate the opportunity to cross-examine 
the witness. Nor would rules 402 and 403 have precluded Defendants from 
testifying in the other's separate trial, particularly where both testified 
consistently that Chad was the sole producer and distributor of the 
marijuana. In other words, all the evidence admitted in the joint trial would 
be admissible in separate trials. Thus, Defendants' unpreserved claims do 
not show that they were prejudiced by joinder of their cases for trial. 
But more importantly, given the overwhelming evidence of their 
guilt, Defendants have not shown that they would have fared better in 
separate tr·ials, even if Hanson's confession would have been inadmissible 
in a separate trial against Nay, and even if they did not testify in each 
other's trials. 
15 
A. To defeat joinder, Defendants must show that 
evidence admitted in the joint trial would be 
inadmissible in separate trials. 
When a court considers joining two or more defendants' cases for 
trial, its analysis involves a participation and a prejudice prong. Under the 
participation prong, the court considers whether Defendants initially "could 
have been joined in a single indictment or information." Utah Code Ann. 
§77-8a-1(3)(a). Multiple defendants may be joined in a single indictment or 
information "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
conduct or in the same criminal episode." Id. §77-8a-1(2)(b). Defendants 
concede that their cases meet that standard. Aplt. Br. at 39. 
Under the prejudice prong, the court must consider whether "'a 
defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced ... by a joinder for trial 
together." Id. §77-8a-1(4)(a). If so, "the court shall ... grant a severance of 
defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires." Id. Although 
"[d]oubts concerning prejudice should be resolved by the trial court in favor 
of a defendant," State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1980), trial courts 
have "considerable latitude" in selecting the appropriate relief based on 
their weighing of prejudice "against considerations of economy and 
expedition in judicial adminish·ation," State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 
(Utah 1977). Reversal of a trial court's ruling on a motion to join or sever, 
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therefore, is appropriate only when "it is affirmatively shown that a 
defendant's right to a fair trial has been impaired." Collins, 612 P.2d at 777. 
Furthermore, " [ a ]ny error in denying severance will be deemed harmless 
unless defendant can establish a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome if the court had granted a severance." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, 
,I34, 55 P.3d 573 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Velarde, 
734 P.2d 440, 445 & n.10 (Utah 1986); State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822, 825 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
When, as here, claims of prejudice focus on admissibility, there can be 
no prejudice when all the evidence admitted at trial would be admissible in 
separate trials as well. Prejudice may indeed arise when evidence 
admissible against one defendant but inadmissible against the other is 
admitted in a joint h·ial. See Velarde, 734 P.2d at 445 (assessing prejudice by 
examining "evidence that might have been different or unavailable at a 
separate trial"); see also Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 644-45 (2016) (stating in 
joint death penalty proceeding that admitting evidence that would be 
inadmissible in separate proceedings may implicate due process); Zaftro, 506 
U.S. at 539 ("Evidence that is probative of a defendant's guilt but technically 
admissible only against a codefendant also might present a risk of 
prejudice."). Similarly, prejudice 1nay also arise when a confession by one 
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defendant directly implicates a co-defendant and the protections of the 
Confrontation Clause are not satisfied. See Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ,r,r40-46 
( concluding that defendant's right to confrontation was violated in joint trial 
but that error was harmless). But when all the evidence presented at a joint 
trial would also be admissible in separate trials, there can be no prejudice.5 
Even when evidence would be inadmissible in separate trials, 
severance is not automatic. See Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-1(4)(a) (stating that 
in face of prejudice, "the court shall ... grant a severance of defendants, or 
provide other relief as justice requires" (emphasis added)); Calliham, 2002 UT 
86, ilif35-37 (approving use of limiting instructions to protect against 
prejudice in joint trial so long as evidence does not give rise to 
Confrontation Clause problems); State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 
1986) (stating that doubts should be resolved in favor of severance, but 
acknowledging that "possible prejudice" should be weighed against 
"considerations of economy and practicalities of judicial administration"); 
see also Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 645 ("The mere admission of evidence that might 
5 In theory, there are other grounds that could establish prejudice 
from joinder, such as irreconcilable and mutually exclusive defenses. E.g., 
Velarde, 734 P.2d at 445. But Defendants have abandoned any such claims 
on appeal and have focused exclusively on evidentiary and constitutional 
admissibility in separate trials. 
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not otherwise have been admitted in a severed proceeding does not demand 
the automatic vacatur of a death sentence."); Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39 
(stating that "risk" of prejudice "might occur" when evidence inadmissible 
against one co-defendant is admitted against another, and emphasizing that 
"even if prejudice is shown," the federal rule "leaves the tailoring of the 
relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound discretion" 
(emphases added)). 
As shown below, Nay has not established prejudice on either an 
evidentiary or constitutional basis. 
B. Because Hanson's confession was not hearsay, it 
would have been admissible in separate trials. 
Hanson's confession was not hearsay because it meets the definition 
of non-hearsay in rule 801(d)(l)(A), Utah Rules of Evidence.6 
6 Nay argues that admitting the alleged hearsay statement violated 
both the state and federal Due Process Clauses. Aplt. Br. at 36-39. He does 
not separately brief the state constitutional claim and has thus forfeited it. 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, if 18, 164 P.3d 397 ("[C]ursory references to the 
state constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a federal 
constitutional claim are inadequate."). Nor did he argue due process before 
the trial court. To the extent he simply means that his "right to a 
fundamentally fair h·ial" has been impaired by the admission of the alleged 
hearsay, Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1350, the argument is properly before this Court. 
Regardless, because the confession was not hearsay and would not be 
hearsay in severed trials, as demonstrated below, joinder resulted in no 
error, constitutional or otherwise. 
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An out-of-court statement is not hearsay when (1) the declarant 
testifies, (2) the declarant is "subject to cross-examination" about the prior 
statement, and (3) either (a) the prior statement is "inconsistent with the 
declarant's testimony," (b) "the declarant denies having made the 
statement," or (c) the declarant "has forgotten." Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(l)(A). 
Hanson's confession satisfies each condition. Hanson testified at trial 
and was subject to cross-examination about her confession.7 According to 
her confession-admitted at trial through Detective Jenkins-Nay, Hanson, 
and Chad were all responsible for growing and preparing to distribute the 
7 Hanson testified in her own defense and was cross-examined by the 
State. Although Nay and Hanson were represented by the same attorney, 
Nay has not alleged a conflict of interest and has pointed to nothing that 
precluded him from fully challenging Hanson's prior statement through 
direct, re-direct, or, if need be, separate cross-examination. Cf Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 58, 70-71 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (concluding that defense counsel's direct 
examination of witness at preliminary hearing comported with the principal 
purpose of cross-examination in form and substance); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 
U.S. 622, 624 (1971) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation when co-
defendant took stand in his own defense, even though defendant's counsel 
did not cross-exa1nine co-defendant but was "fully free to do so"). Indeed, 
counsel in fact confronted Hanson about the out-of-court statement on 
direct examination and obtained testimony that was favorable to Nay. Cf 
Nelson, 402 U.S. at 629 (noting that co-defendant's direct testimony 
regarding his alleged confession "was more favorable to the respondent 





marijuana. R304:74-77. In her trial testimony, Hanson said she could not 
remember making the statement or even speaking with Detective Jenkins. 
R304:298-99. She also stated that the substance of her confession was false 
and she testified extensively that Chad was solely responsible for the 
marijuana. R304:299-306. Her confession therefore qualified as non-
hearsay both because her in-court testimony was inconsistent with the 
confession and because she could not remember making the out-of-court 
statement. See Utah R. Evid. 801( d)(l)(A). 
As non-hearsay, the confession was admissible not only against 
Hanson as the declarant-witness, but also against Nay. For example, in 
State v. King, this Court concluded that some of the out-of-court statements 
of a defendant's accomplice- offered into evidence by the detective with 
whom she had spoken-were inconsistent with the accomplice's trial 
testimony and thus admissible in King's trial. 2012 UT App 203, ,r,35-47., 
283 P.3d 980. Furthermore, as non-hearsay, Hanson's confession was 
admissible as substantive evidence and not merely impeachment evidence. 
See .In re J.C., 2016 UT App 10, if28 n.9. 8 
8 This Court issued In re J.C. after Defendants filed their opening brief. 
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Nay has presented no evidence suggesting any other outcome was 
reasonably likely in separate trials. In that sense, this case is akin to State v. 
Jaimez. There, this Court rejected Jaimez' s claim that had separate trials 
been ordered, his co-defendant would have testified for Jaimez and 
presented exculpatory testimony. See 817 P.2d at 825-26. The Court 
explained that, given the co-defendant's refusal to testify in a joint trial, 
Jaimez could not show that his co-defendant was reasonably likely to testify 
in a separate h·ial or that he would present exculpatory testimony if he did. 
Id. Likewise, given Hanson's exculpatory testimony in the joint trial, Nay 
has not shown that it was reasonably likely that Hanson would not have 
testified at his separate trial. Nor has he shown that her testimony would 
have differed in a way that both favored Nay and rendered the out-of-court 
statement inadmissible. Hanson either would have testified in a manner 
consistent with her confession- in which case any error in the joint trial 
would be harmless-or she would have testified the same way she did in 
the joint trial- in which case the confession would be admissible as a prior 
inconsistent statement. 
In su1n, Nay has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by joinder 
because all the evidence admitted at the joint trial would have been 
admissible in separate trials. Thus, his right to a fair trial was not infringed, 
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and there was no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the 
trials been severed. 
C. This Court should not review Defendants' remaining 
arguments because they did not preserve them and 
have not argued plain error; in any event, no error-
plain or otherwise-occurred by joining the cases for 
trial. 
Nay additionally argues that a joint trial prejudiced hhn because, had 
the h·ials been severed, Hanson's confession could not have been admitted 
against him without violating the Confrontation Clause. Aplt. Br. at 33, 35-
36. Nay and Hanson also argue that they were prejudiced by joinder 
because each co-defendant's testimony was irrelevant to the other's 
culpability and would have confused or misled the jury. Aplt. Br. at 21-27. 
Because Defendants failed to preserve these arguments and have not 
argued plain error on appeal, this Court should not address them. But even 
under a plain error analysis, Defendants' arguments fail. There was no 
Confrontation Clause violation, because Nay had the opportunity to cross-
examine Hanson at trial and would have in a separate trial as well. 
Defendants' evidentiary arguments also are meritless because each co-
defendant's testimony was relevant to determining the other's culpability 
and did not confuse or mislead the jury. Again, because all the evidence 
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admitted at the joint trial would be admissible in separate trials, Defendants 
suffered no prejudice by joining their cases for trial. 
1. Defendants have forfeited their remaining, unpreserved 
arguments by failing to argue plain error before this 
Court. 
In their opposition to the State's joinder 1notion, Defendants argued 
that Hanson's confession would be hearsay in Nay's separate trial and that 
the two had irreconcilable, mutually exclusive defenses. R131-34. They did 
not mention confrontation, relevance, rule 403, or any other reason that the 
two would be prejudiced by joinder. R131-34. 
Defendants have not satisfied the standard for preservmg their 
re1naining arguments for appellate review. To preserve an issue for appeal, 
it "must have been presented to the district court in such a way that the 
court has an opportunity to rule" on the issue. State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, 
ifl9, 353 P.3d 55, as amended (Mar. 13, 2015) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); accord State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Ill, 10 P.3d 346. 
That was not done here. Before the trial court, Defendants focused 
their admissibility arguments exclusively on the hearsay issue; they never 
mentioned other evidentiary rules, the Confrontation Clause, or even the 
issue of cross-examination. R131-34. Opposing joinder on one basis does 
not preserve an argument opposing joinder on another. See Patterson v. 
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Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,r,r14-20, 266 P.3d 828 (noting that although appellate 
court will address new authority raised on appeal, it will not address new 
issues, claims, arguments, or matters absent some exception to the 
preservation rule). A contrary rule would violate "[n]otions of fairness" 
and judicial economy by "revers[ing] a district court for a reason presented 
first on appeal," without giving the opposing party a chance to counter the 
argument or the trial court an opportunity to rule on it. Id. ,r,rlS-16. 
Because Defendants have not preserved the issues for appeal, this Court 
should not reach them. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Ill. 
Under the plain error exception to the preservation rule, relief may be 
available if the appellant proves obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). But parties forfeit any right to plain 
error review by failing in their opening brief to "articulate an appropriate 
justification for appellate review" of any unpreserved arguments. See State 
v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, if 45, 114 P.3d 551; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 
n.5 (Utah 1995). For example, in State v. Pham, the defendant moved to 
sever his trial from his co-defendant's based on potential Confrontation 
Clause violations. 2015 UT App 233, if if 2-3, 6, 359 P.3d 1284, cert. denied 364 
P.3d 48 (Utah 2015). But Pham abandoned that argument on appeal because 
his co-defendant testified; instead, he argued that he and his co-defendant 
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had antagonistic defenses. Id. ifif 6-7. This Court declined to address 
Pham' s new arguments because they were unpreserved and because Pham 
did not argue plain error until oral argument. Id. 
This case is no different. Defendants did not give the trial court an 
opportunity to rule on the Confrontation Clause, rule 402, or rule 403. Nor 
have Defendants asserted any exception to the preservation rule, let alone 
articulated how those exceptions would justify relief on appeal. Because 
Defendants have doubly forfeited their remaining arguments, this Court 
should not address them. 
2. Nay has not established any potential violation of the 
Confrontation Clause, let alone an obvious one. 
In any event, Nay's first unpreserved argu1nent lacks merit. He 
argues that he was prejudiced by joinder because admitting Hanson's 
confession in Nay's separate trial would violate the Confrontation Clause. 
He asserts that Hanson's confession was testimonial and that, in the severed 
trial, he would not have had an opportunity to cross-examine Hanson about 
her confession due to her inability to recall her interview with Detective 
Jenkins. Aplt. Br. at 27-36. For legal support, Nay relies primarily on 
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123 (1968).9 
The State agrees that Hanson's confession was testimonial. But Nay 
was not denied the right to confront Hanson through cross-examination in 
the joint trial, nor would he have been in a separate trial. Because Hanson 
testified in the joint trial, admitting her out-of-court statement against Nay 
did not violate Crawford or Bruton. Nor can Nay show any reasonable 
likelihood that admitting her confession in a separate trial would have 
violated his confrontation rights. Furthermore, Hanson's faulty memory 
was no impediment to cross-examination. Rather, defense counsel used 
Hanson's faulty memory to draw out testimony favorable to Nay, as 
defense counsel likely would have done in a separate trial. 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
9 Nay repeatedly refers to Hanson's confession as "an involuntary 
confession." Aplt. Br. at 35, 36, 37. But neither Defendant challenged the 
voluntariness of the confession below, nor have they questioned it on 
appeal, other than to offhandedly call it "involuntary." Such passing 
references are insufficient to carry an appellant's burden for an unpreserved 
claim on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 
170, if15, 72 P.3d 138 (deeming inadequate the assertion of "legal 
conclusions with no legal analysis"). 
27 
against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 
(1965) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment made the right of 
confrontation applicable to the states). The right of confrontation includes 
the right to cross-examine. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404. In Crawford, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that before "an absent witness's" testimonial statements 
could be admitted against a defendant, the Confrontation Clause required 
that the witness be unavailable and that the defendant have had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine that witness. See 541 U.S. at 54, 68 (emphasis 
added). 
But here Hanson testified at trial and in all likelihood would have 
done so in a separate trial. Crawford therefore does not apply. See id. at 53-
54 (discussing the constitutional requirements for admitting "testimonial 
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial"). In fact, "none of [the 
Supreme Court's] decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause requires 
excluding the out-of-court statements of a witness who is available and 
testifying at trial." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161, 162 (1970); accord, 
e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) ("In the usual case (including cases 
where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either 
produce, or demonsh·ate the unavailability of, the declarant whose 
statement it wishes to use against the defendant." (e1nphasis added)), 
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abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); State 
v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah 1989) (concluding that admitting child's 
out-of-court accusation did not violate defendant's confrontation rights 
because child testified at trial and was cross-examined). Nay had the 
opportunity to confront Hanson face-to-face and to cross-examine her at 
trial, just as he would have if she testified in a separate trial. Nay's 
constitutional right to confrontation was therefore secure. 
Nay's arguments under Bruton fare no better. There, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that, despite curative jury instructions, a defendant's 
confrontation rights were violated in a joint trial when the prosecutor 
adduced a confession from a non-testifying co-defendant that directly 
implicated the defendant. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124-26; Richardson v. Marsh, 
481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987) (limiting Bruton to statements expressly implicating 
defendant). In later cases, the Supreme Court made explicit what was 
implicit in Bruton: Admitting a co-defendant's out-of-court statements 
against a defendant implicates the Confrontation Clause only when the co-
defendant does not testify at trial. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626, 629-30 
(1971); see also Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206 ("[W]here two defendants are tried 
jointly, the pretrial confession of one cannot be admitted against the other 
unless the confessing defendant takes the stand." (emphasis added)); Bruton, 391 
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U.S. at 128 (noting that co-defendant was not subject to cross-examination 
"since [he] did not take the stand"). 
For example, in Nelson v. O'Neil, the Supreme Court found no 
confrontation violation when (1) a co-defendant admitted his involvement 
and implicated the defendant in a statement to a police officer; (2) the officer 
testified about the confession at trial; and (3) the co-defendant took the 
stand, denied making the statement, "vigorously asserted" that the 
substance of it was false, and presented an alibi consistent 
defendant's. 402 U.S. at 624, 629-30. The Court concluded that, because the 
defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-defendant on the 
witness stand, the defendant's confrontation rights were not violated. Id. at 
629-30. It did not matter that the defendant chose not to cross-examine his 
co-defendant, particularly in light of the favorable testimony presented by 
the co-defendant. Id. at 624, 629. The Court further stated that "the absence 






court statement is immaterial, so long as the declarant can be cross-
examined on the witness stand at trial." Id. at 626. 10 
This case is indistinguishable from Nelson. After Officer Jenkins 
testified about Hanson's confession, Hanson took the stand and declared 
that she could not remember the confession and adamantly denied the 
substance of it. Hanson then mirrored Nay's testimony by stating that Chad 
was solely responsible for the marijuana. Nay was "fully free" to cross-
examine Hanson-either about the out-of-court statement or the underlying 
events- but he had no reason to do so because her in-court testimony was 
favorable to him on both accounts. See id. at 624. Once Hanson took the 
stand at trial, use of her out-of-court statement became an evidentiary issue, 
not a constitutional one. 
This Court's opinion in Pham also illustrates the point. Although 
Pham did not directly address the Confrontation Clause issue, it 
acknowledged the inapplicability of Bruton when a co-defendant testifies in 
a joint trial. Pham had argued before trial "that a joint trial would result in 
10 Although Nelson stated that the co-defendant's confession was 
admissible only as to the co-defendant and not as to the defendant, that 
conclusion was based on state hearsay law. 402 U.S. at 626. As 
demonstrated above, under Utah law Hanson's confession was not hearsay 
and thus was admissible against both Hanson and Nay. See supra Part B. 
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injustice because it would pit his Sixth Amendment right to confront [his co-
defendant] against [the co-defendant's] Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent." Pham, 2015 UT App 233, if 6. But "[b]ecause [the co-defendant] 
testified at trial," this Court stated that Pham had "necessarily abandoned 
this argument for severance altogether." Id. (emphasis added). See also State 
v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1987) (describing Bruton as governing the 
use of "extrajudicial statements 1nade by a nontestifiJing codefendant" 
(emphasis added)). 
But even if the potential for a confrontation violation existed, that 
potential would not have been obvious to the trial court before trial, 
particularly where no one suggested that Hanson would not testify. See 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208 (requiring error to be obvious for relief under plain 
error). Moreover, as noted, Hanson's confession would have been 
admissible against her in her own separate trial as a statement against a 
party-opponent. See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (providing that out-of-court 
statement is not hearsay if" offered against an opposing party" and "made 
by the party in an individual or representative capacity"). In the face of that 
admissible confession, Hanson likely would have taken the stand and given 
the testimony she gave at the joint trial- that she could not reme1nber 
making the confession and that it was not h◄ue. The State could then call her 
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to testify in Nay's separate trial, where the substance of her out-of-court 
confession could come in either through Hanson herself or through 
Detective Jenkins. Thus, it would not have been obvious to the trial court 
that joining the cases for trial would have prejudiced Nay. 
Nay further argues that he was prejudiced by joinder because Hanson 
"was not subject to significant cross-examination given [her] diminished 
perception of the events at the time based on her drug-usage infirmity." 
Aplt. Br. at 33-36. But when a witness testifies at trial, a defendant's 
confrontation rights are not violated when-like here-the witness claims 
memory loss or testifies in a manner inconsistent with her out-of-court 
statement. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557-60 (1988); Green, 399 
U.S. at 167-68. "[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware 
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). For a defendant to show an inadequate 
opportunity to cross-examine a testifiJing witness, he would have to show 
h·ial court action that in some way "limit[ed] the scope or nature of defense 
counsel's cross-examination." See id. at 19. It is not enough .to show that a 
"lapse of memory" acted as an inherent impediment on "one method of 
discrediting" the witness. See id. Indeed, through cross-examination, a 
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defendant may use a witness's lack of memory to undermine her out-of-
court statements. Owens, 484 U.S. at 559-60; Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 19-20. 
That the cross-examination was ultimately unsuccessful at persuading the 
jury does not render the opportunity constitutionally deficient. Owens, 484 
U.S. at 560. 
For example, in United States v. Owens, the Supreme Court held that 
the accused enjoyed a full opportunity to cross-examine a testifying witness 
about an out-of-court identification despite that witness's inability to recall 
the underlying events that formed the basis of his identification. 484 U.S. at 
556, 559-60. And in California v. Green, the Supreme Court found no 
violation of the Confrontation Clause when the prosecution called a witness 
who could not remember the event in question due to drug use and then 
presented the witness's prior statements. 399 U.S. at 151-52, 167-68. The 
Court explained that once a witness has been produced at trial, regardless of 
whether that witness "then testified in a 1nanner consistent or inconsistent 
with his preliminary hearing testimony, clahned a loss of memory, claimed 
his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, or simply refused to 
answer, nothing in the Confrontation Clause prohibited the State from also 
relying on his prior testimony to prove its case." Id. at 167-68. 
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Nay had a full opportunity to confront and examine Hanson about 
her confession to Detective Jenkins and her lack of memory. 11 The trial 
court did not limit the scope or nature of Hanson's examination. Indeed, 
defense counsel elicited favorable testimony from Hanson and fully 
explored her lack of memory. R304:296-300. Nay has made no showing 
that a separate trial would have proceeded any differently. 
In short, because Nay had the ,.,opportunity to challenge his accuser 
in a face-to-face encounter in front of the trier of fact," Green, 399 U.S. at 
156- and would have had the same opportunity in a separate trial-joinder 
did not plainly deny Nay a fair trial. 12 
11 As noted, see supra note 7, the fact that defense counsel questioned 
Hanson through direct and re-direct examination rather than cross-
examination does not negate the opportunity to cross-examine Hanson, 
because defense counsel was "fully free to do so." Nelson, 402 U.S. at 624. 
12 Nay also briefly casts his memory-loss argument in terms of 
availability. See Aplt. Br. at 33 (arguing that, due to Hanson's inability to 
recall the confession, in a severed trial Hanson "may have been deemed 
unavailable as a witness ... with regard to the content of her interviews 
with Jenkins"). Nay cites no supporting authority, and Supreme Court 
precedent forecloses his argument. Unavailability is a prerequisite to 
admitting an absent witness's testimonial statements. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
45, 54, 68. Hanson was not and would not be an absent witness. 
( ... continued on next page) 
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3. Defendants' testimonies did not plainly violate rules 402 
or 403. 
Defendants' second unpreserved argument also lacks merit. 
Defendants argue that they were prejudiced by joinder because in separate 
trials, their codefendant' s testimonies would be irrelevant, confusing, and 
misleading and thus inadmissible under rules 402 and 403. But Defendants 
have again failed to demonstrate error, let alone plain error. Each co-
defendant's testimony was relevant to determining their own and the 
other's culpability and did not confuse or mislead the jury. 
Nay first argues that statements Hanson and Chad made about their 
own culpability were irrelevant to Nay's culpability. Aplt. Br. at 25-26. See 
Utah R. Evid. 402. He acknowledges that Hanson and Chad made 
statements exculpating Nay, but he asserts that the jury did not believe that 
exculpatory testimony because Hanson's and Chad's credibility was 
undermined when they inculpated themselves. Aplt. Br. at 26. 
Buried in his Confrontation Clause argument, Nay also mentions 
Hanson's faulty memory in tenns of her competence to testify. Aplt. Br. at 
31-32, 35. But Nay acknowledges that witnesses are competent to testify 
unless the Utah Rules of Evidence provide otherwise. Aplt. Br. at 31. See 
Utah R. Evid. 6Q1. Nay does not identify-let alone develop any argument 
based on-any rule that would render Hanson incompetent to testify. He 
has therefore failed to carry his burden on appeal, and this Court should not 
address the issue. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998). 
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In fact, Hanson made no inculpatory statements at trial. To the extent 
Nay is referring to her out-of-court confession, that statement was 
admissible, as demonstrated above. And the relevance of Hanson's 
confession-at least the part inculpating Nay-is not disputed. Even 
assuming the part of the confession relating only to Hanson's and Chad's 
involvement was irrelevant, its admission could have had little impact in 
light of the statement directly inculpating Nay. 
But Nay is wrong that one co-defendant's culpability is irrelevant to 
another's. "Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency to make a 
[material] fact more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence .... " Utah R. Evid. 401 ( emphasis added). By its terms, rule 401 
establishes "a very low bar that deems even evidence with the slightest 
probative value relevant and presumptively admissible." State v. 
Richardson, 2013 UT 50, if 24, 308 P.3d 526 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). When three people are detained in a house strewn with 
marijuana, any one person's acceptance or denial of responsibility makes 
the remaining persons' culpability more probable or less probable. For 
example, when Chad said that he alone was responsible for the marijuana, 
his statement not only inculpated himself, the statement- if believed- also 
made it less likely that Nay or Hanson were responsible. Thus, any 
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witness's self-inculpating statement was relevant to each co-defendant's 
cul pa bili ty. 
Hanson makes a related argument. She claims that Nay's statement 
that he "was simply a user and not involved" in the production or 
distribution of drugs was irrelevant to her culpability. Aplt. Br. at 26. 
Again, one person's denial of responsibility- if believed - would increase 
the chances that the remaining two people were culpable. Thus, Nay's 
testimony exculpating himself was relevant to Hanson and did not render 
the trial court's joinder ruling plainly erroneous. Indeed, Hanson implicitly 
acknowledges the relevance of Nay's testimony to her case when, in the 
same sentence where she labels it irrelevant, she states that Nay's testimony 
would make it appear more probable "that she was providing [1narijuana] 
to outsiders as a distributer." Aplt. Br. at 26. 
Defendants also argue in passing that the joint trial led to the 
confusion of issues and misled the jury. Aplt. Br. at 25-26; see Utah R. Evid. 
403. Defendants have not carried their burden of explaining how jointly 
h 4 ying them confused or misled the jury. To carry their burden on appeal, 
appellants must not only cite legal authority but also develop that authority 
and present "reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Defendants 
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assert in a subheading that joinder misled the jury "and resulted in 
confusion of the charges against each separate individual." Aplt. Br. at 21 
(formatting and capitalization omitted). The only charge unique to Hanson 
was possession of a firearm by a restricted person. But Defendants nowhere 
suggest in their brief that the firearm charge was a basis for the alleged 
confusion. Aplt. Br. at 20-27. Nor could they. The testimony about the 
firearms was limited to Hanson - they were, after all, discovered in her 
bedroom-and the jury instructions and verdict forms clearly differentiated 
between which charges applied to which defendants. R210, 213-14, 216-17, 
222-23, 239-40; R304:21-27, 329; R(Hanson)248-49. 
Nay further argues that Hanson's and Chad's testimony "would 
confuse the jury as to which defendant committed which crime" - all to 
Nay's detriment because Nay was less culpable than Hanson.1 3 Aplt. Br. at 
13 Defendants stated below, in passing, that the two co-defendants 
had varying levels of culpability. See R133 ("However, it could be argued 
that co-defendant, Tracy L. Hanson, had a closer connection and more 
culpability to the alleged controlled substances located in her residence."). 
But they did not preserve that argument. The statement appears from the 
briefing below to relate to the participation prong of the joinder analysis, 
R133-34, which Defendants do not challenge on appeal. But to the extent 
Defendants offered it below in relation to the prejudice prong, they did not 
develop that argument or explain its relevance. A "passing reference" that 
a party "completely fail[s] to pursue or develop" does not preserve an issue 
for appeal. See State v. Quintana, 826 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
( ... continued on next page) 
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26. To the extent that Nay refers solely to the drug-related charges and not 
to the firearm charge, his argument presumes what the jury verdict 
forecloses. The jury convicted Nay and Hanson of the same drug-related 
charges, and Defendants have not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting that conviction. Thus, any analysis must proceed from the 
undisputed starting point that Nay was in fact guilty of the same crimes 
that Hanson committed. Bald, conclusory assertions aside, Defendants have 
done nothing to show that the jury was confused or misled into reaching 
that decision or that Defendants were otherwise deprived of a fair trial. See 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. And in fact, there was nothing confusing about 
Nay's, Hanson's, and Chad's testimonies. They uniformly pointed to Chad 
as the sole culprit. The jury simply did not believe it. 
In short, the trial court did not err- let alone obviously err- by 
joining the cases for trial. 
On appeal, Nay does not mention the supposed varying degrees of 
culpability between the two Defendants as an independent basis for relief. 
Rather, he mentions it only to illustrate why he believes that the allegedly 
irrelevant, misleading, or confusing testimony prejudiced him. Because 
Nay never presented that argument to the trial court in a manner that gave 
the court an opportunity to rule on it, it is unpreserved. See Houston, 2015 
UT 40, ,I19. 
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D. Because the evidence of Defendants' guilt was 
overwhelming, any alleged error was harmless. 
Even if it were error to join the trials, any error was harmless because 
there is no reasonable likelihood of a different result had the cases been 
severed. See State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, 'if44, 361 P.3d 104. Although Nay 
argues that Hanson's confession was the only evidence of his guilt, Aplt. Br. 
at 38, Nay ignores the mountain of additional evidence adduced in this case. 
When the police arrived to execute the search warrant, Nay was 
smoking a joint in a house overspread with marijuana. R303:23-24, 32-33, 
38, 41-47, 50; R304:6-7, 11, 43, 49-50, 136-37, 140, 277, 299-300. The police 
found Nay in a room that had all the necessary implements to prepare 
marijuana for distribution: a digital scale, two bowls with marijuana 
residue, two large bags of marijuana, and several smaller bags in which to 
divide the marijuana. And the police found three glass quart jars of 
marijuana in Nay's backpack, directly tying him to the illegal activity of 
preparing the marijuana for distribution. R303:24. Regardless of the story 
put forth by Nay, Hanson, and Chad to explain away this evidence, the jury 
reasonably interpreted the evidence as proof that Nay actively participated 
not only in smoking the marijuana, but also in packaging and preparing it 
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to sell. In the face of that evidence, any error in joining the trials was 
harmless as to the charges against Nay. 14 
The evidence against Hanson is even stronger. It was, after all, her 
house. With marijuana in plain sight, turning up in drawers in her kitchen 
and bedroom, and growing in her basement, neither Nay's nor Chad's 
statements about their own culpability were likely to sway the jury that 
Hanson had nothing to do with the marijuana. The evidence of Hanson's 
involvement in the marijuana production and distribution was 
overwhelming. Any error therefore would have also been harmless as to 
Hanson. 
CONCLUSION 
Because all the evidence admitted in the joint trial would have been 
admissible in separate trials, Defendants were not prejudiced by joinder. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm. 
14 Admittedly, Nay's connection to the marijuana growing in the 
basement is not as strong. But the jury reasonably could have relied on the 
overwhelming evidence that Nay, Hanson, and Chad were all involved in a 
joint enterprise. The jury reasonably could have inferred from Nay's full 
involven1ent in every other aspect of that enterprise that he was also aware 
of and involved in growing the marijuana with his cousins. Cf State v. 
Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986) ("[I]t is a well-settled rule that 
circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the 
accused."). 
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§ 77-Ba-1. J oinder of offenses and of defendants 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same 
indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged 
are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission; 
or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(2)(a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant is afforded a 
preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor and felony offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if 
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct or in the same criminal 
episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all 
of the defendants need not be charged in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be 
tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or otherwise orders separate 
trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(3)(a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be h·ied 
together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have been 
joined in a single indictment or information. 
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a single indictment 
or information. 
(4)(a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, 
the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance 
of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if the motion is 
not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant for 
severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose any statements made by the 
defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at the trial. 
Utah R. Evid. 801. Definitions 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal 
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A" declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made 
the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony 
and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of re-
cent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a 
person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is 
(A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capac-
ity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in 
its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a 
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, 
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a cocon-
spirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
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OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO JOIN AND MEMORANDUM 
V 
iviiCHAEL L NAY. Def end ant 
And 
CP..SE NO. 121600009 
TRACY L HANSON CASE NO. 121600010 
Judge _____ _ 
Comes now, the Defendants, by and through their attorney, Kenneth L 
Combs, who does hereby object to the State's Motion to Join the defendants' 
cases 1n this matter and would show the court as follows: 
BACKGROUND 
1. The state's rendition of the state's allegations are substantially correct as 
derived from law enforcement reports including the most concerning piece 
of evidence, that of the alleged confession of defendant, Tracy L Hanson. 
2. The co-defendant, Chad Hanson, has resolved his case by a global plea 
agreement. 
I. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Section 77-Ba-1 (2012) of the Utah Code governs the issues raised 
in State's motion to join and sets for a two-step process for 
determining joinder. For purposes of this objection and with regard 
to the first step the defense concedes that the defendants are 
II. 
alleged to 11 participated in the same act or in the same criminal 
episode". However, it could be argued that co-defendant, Tracy L 
Hanson, had a closer connection and more culpability to the 
alleged controlled substances located in her residence. 
Further, the state alleges that all evidence in the trial of one 
defendant would be admitted in the trial of the second. It is clear 
that the state would attempt to introduce the same evidence in both 
trials including hearsay statements of the each co-defendant. 
Defense would attempt to prevent such hearsay statements. 
Further, in a trial involving only Tracy Hanson the state's efforts to 
admit her alleged confession as set forth in the states's motion 
would be successful; however, in a separate trial involving Michael 
Nay the defense would be successful in excluding Ms Hanson's 
alleged confession. Accordingly, joining these two cases would in 
fact prejudice certainly Mr Nay but also potentially Ms Hanson if he 
were to turn and attack the accuracy of Ms Hanson's alleged 
incriminating statements. 
111. It is upon the second step that the state's motion should clearly be 
denied. Section 77-8a-1 (2012) of the Utah Code sets forth in 
relevant part that if the court finds that a defendant is prejudiced by 
joinder then it should order separate trials. The defendants will be 
prejudiced by the joinder that the state requests. Although the state 
correctly cites a few cases suggesting that simply because one 
defendant would give exculpatory evidence for the other, or 
antagonistic testimony or finger pointing against the other 
defendant does not always defeat a motion to join. those cases 
are not on point. In the instant cases, the fact that the co-
defendant, Tracy Hanson, made an alleged confession should be 
enough to defeat the State's motion. Here, Defendants assert that 
their defenses will be antagonistic and that those antagonistic 
defenses are irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. For purposes 
of analysis on this point the case of State v Telford, 950560-CA 
( 1997) is more helpful to the Court. In that case Telford was 
convicted of murder and appealed his conviction arguing that the 
court erred by denying his motion to sever. At trial Telford argued 
that the co-defendant actually pulled the trigger and forced him to 
participate. The co-defendant argued that he was not even present 
at the scene. The Court of Appeals in Telford stated that the 
defendant and co-defendant's defenses were mutually exclusive 
because the jury was required to reject one defense in order to 
believe the other and it determined that the trial court had erred in 
"refusing to sever the trial." The Court of Appeals in Telford cited 
Section 77-Ba-1 of the Utah Code and stated that the Utah 
Supreme Court had interpreted this section in State v Collins, 612 
P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1980) as meaning that "doubts concerning 




defendanf. The Court of Appeals continued by indicating that the 
Utah Supreme Court stated in State v O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 898 
(Utah 1986) that "although trial courts 1appear to be reluctant to 
grant severance' that reluctance is ill-advised and in the long run 
risks greater expenditure of judicial resources". The Supreme 
Court continuing stated 'Thus, if 'joint defendants have defenses 
that appear to be inconsistent with or to obstruct or impede each 
other' trial courts must ·carefully examine' severance requests and 
'grant severance when there is any doubt as to prejudice."' In the 
instant case, assuming that the court's admits co-defendant's, 
Tracy Hanson, alleged confession and this is taken as her position 
then certainly her defense, if any, would be antagonistic and 
irreconcilable and thus mutually exclusive. Mr Nay1s defense 
would contradict the alleged confession of Ms Hanson. Their 
defenses are truly antagonistic. They are irreconcilable and 
mutually exclusive. The joinder of the two cases would be 
prejudicial to both defendants. 
Conclusion. The court should overrule and deny the state's motion 
to join. 
Dated this the 1 ?'h day of Feb .. 2014. 
/s/ 
--- --------
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I_,) SIXTH DISTRICT COURT-RICHFIELD 
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
?GI~ MM~ l 7 Mj 9: 20 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL L NAY, 
Defendant. 
1:1 "T 1'l-MEMORANDUM DECISION 1'\AND ORDER 
Case No: 121600009 
Judge: WALLACE A LEE 
Date: March 14, 2014 
The State has filed a Motion to Join. The motion has been fully 
briefed and submitted for decision without hearing. 
The Court has carefully reviewed the memoranda supporting and 
opposing the motion, and agrees with the State. 
The Court finds Ms. Hanson and Mr. Nay could have been charged in 
the same information because they are accused of jointly 
participating in the same crime, at the same time, as part of the 
same criminal episode. 
Furthermore, virtually all of the evidence would be the same 
against both defendants. 
In addition, the Court is not convinced either defendant would 
suffer undue prejudice in a joint trial. Defendants have not shown 
any defense which would be irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. 
It is fairly common for co-defendants to blame each other or 
argue the other defendant is more culpable. The Court finds such 
antagonistic defenses are not enough to show the prejudice 
necessary for the Court to order separate trials. 
Likewise, it is not enough to merely argue either defendant would 
have a greater chance for acquittal if tried separately. 
Defendants have pointed to only one matter which is potentially 
prejudicial. Ms. Hanson allegedly made a statement to police which 
not only confesses to the alleged crimes, but also directly 
implicates Mr. Nay. 
Defendants claim this statement alone is unduly prejudicial. The 
Court disagrees. The Court finds whether the cases are joined for 
trial or not, this statement could be admitted in evidence. If Mr. 
Nay is tried separately, the State could certainly subpoena Ms. 
Hanson to testify. If she testifies inconsistently with her prior 
statement, the State would almost certainly be able to confront her 
with the prior inconsistent statement. 
Therefore, the Court sees no undue prejudice if the statement is 
introduced in a joint trial. 
Finally, the Court finds, contrary to the argument on the last page 
of defendants opposing memorandum, because Ms. Hanson's statement 
to the police is allegedly a confession, this statement is no 
defense. It is hard for the Court to see how Ms. 
Hansen could possibly take a position or present a defense at 
trial consistent with her statement to police, without 
incriminating herself. Therefore, the fact that Mr. Nay would 
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likely attempt to contradict Ms. 
Hanson's statement at trial, does not constitute mutually 
exclusive, irreconcilable defenses. To the Court, such an argument ~ 
appears to be nothing more than typical finger pointing or arguing 
the other defendant is more culpable. 
This potential conflict is not sufficient to require separate 
trials. 
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